



*Boston University Academy Model United Nations Conference III
Saturday, January 31 to Sunday, February 1, 2015
Boston University Academy
Boston, MA*



***Executive Committee of the
National Security Council
(EXCOMM)
Historical Crisis Committee***

Background Guide

Dear Delegates,

My name is Rohit Chaparala, and I'm a senior at BU Academy. I first got involved in Model UN in sixth grade and have since attended close to a dozen conferences since then. In addition to my role as chair of our crisis, I also serve as co-President of BU Academy's Model UN travel team. Last year, I chaired JCC-Colombia in a joint crisis between Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana. The year before that, I chaired JCC-Taiwan on the topic of the hotly contested Senkaku Islands. Outside of Model UN, I'm involved in Student Council and South Asian Student Association at the Academy.

During our simulation over the weekend, I will take on the role of President Kennedy, and you will serve as my most trusted advisors as we consider our options in midst of growing tensions between America and the Soviet Union. All of the ideas during debate will come from you; my only role is to oversee debate. If you're confused about crisis procedure, don't worry too much about this, as we will have a brief but comprehensive training session before we kick off debate.

As with any Model UN conference, the success of your performance as a delegate and our performance as a committee relies heavily on your knowledge of the topic at hand. It is therefore crucial that you do ample background research beforehand. I have faith that you can and will do so. To demonstrate your research, you will be required to hand in a policy paper. These papers are useful for collecting your thoughts and developing ideas to bring forth during debate. Details on the paper are listed before.

Oh, and a quick note. As this is a historical crisis, we will be using the events up until the Cuban Missile Crisis as context for what occurs over the weekend. Our crisis

will start on **October 16, 1962**. Events during the crisis will deviate from what actually occurred in history, so it doesn't make sense to include events during and after the crisis in your research. The Soviet Union you will deal with during debate will act differently from the one EXCOMM dealt with during the actual crisis. In addition, while a major topic of this debate is the Cuban Missile Crisis, the crisis will deal with the Cold War as a whole, so don't exclusively read up on the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Another note: Shamus Miller is a sophomore at Wellesley High School. He'll be serving as Vice Chair for our committee and is also looking forward to meeting you guys come February.

Delegates, I look forward to meeting you all and seeing how you will steer our country through this crisis.

Yours truly,

Rohit Chaparala

excomm@buamun.org

The logo for BUAMUN features the word "BUAMUN" in a large, serif, all-caps font. It is flanked on both sides by a laurel wreath, which is a circular arrangement of two branches of laurel leaves. The entire logo is rendered in a light gray color.

BUAMUN

Crisis Committee Flow of Debate:

Adapted from Phill Giliver, 2013

Crisis committees at BUAMUN and other conferences work differently from “regular” General Assembly (GA) committees. Crises follow a less formal flow of debate, and generally remove many of the elements of parliamentary procedure. Delegates must still raise placards to speak, and must follow the standards of diplomatic politesse; however, elements of debate such as speakers’ lists and moderated/un-moderated caucuses are mostly done away with. Motions for caucuses on specific topics are encouraged, but crisis debate generally runs like a never-ending moderated caucus. This structure is adopted because during a crisis simulation, events and crises can progress rapidly, and a full implementation of parliamentary procedure would only slow delegates’ ability to respond to fast-paced happenings.

There are 3 general measures that delegates in a crisis committee can perform:

1. **Directives:** formal action undertaken by a committee or an individual on a committee.

Directives can contain any *reasonable* action and may be drafted by any delegate on a crisis committee (for example, a directive can declare war on another nation; however, it may also ask the other nation to attend bilateral treaty negotiations). After a draft is written, delegates submit directives to the chair. The chair will then read the directive, at which point delegates can motion to alter the directive or to vote on it.

In some cases, delegates may send private directives to the chair, also known as **portfolio action**. This type of directive depends on the purview of the delegate’s position. For example, the chief of a nation’s intelligence agency may order the secret detainment of a known terrorist. Likewise, the minister of energy for a nation may choose to cut energy agreements with another nation. Conversely, a minister of

culture may not unilaterally declare war, nor may the minister of education impose economic sanctions on another nation, etc.

2. **Press Releases:** formal statements from a committee detailing an action or a committee's stance or opinion. For example, if a committee representing the United States decided to attack Canada (absurdity intended), the committee could issue a Press Release telling the world that they have chosen to break all economic and trade ties with Canada and launch full scale war. Similarly, if the US waged war on Canada, a committee representing the United Kingdom could issue a Press Release condemning the US's action.
3. **Communiqués:** informal communication between individuals or committees. For example, if a committee representing Iran chose to send information to the leader of Hezbollah (a terrorist organization represented on a Lebanese committee), it could do so in a communiqué, and only the addressee would receive the information. Similarly, two economic ministers (for example, of Australia and the UK) could be communicating without anyone else's knowledge through communiqués.

The crisis chairs and crisis staff will inform you of any additional actions that you may take; they will also make sure that no delegate's actions are out of order.

Crises occur rapidly and often throughout the course of crisis simulations—be prepared to think on your feet and to enact whatever measures you and your fellow delegates feel are necessary, and most importantly, have fun!

Position Paper Information

All of the BUAMUN crisis committees require a position paper from each delegate.

Position papers are short pieces of writing indicating a delegate's stance which contribute to a chair's perspective regarding awards. You should probably conduct additional research to write this paper. See the "Outside Research" section at the end of this guide, for helpful researching resources. A position paper should be approximately 1-2 pages, double spaced, and should include the delegate's reaction to each of the topics.

Delegate: Rohit Chaparala

School: Boston University Academy (Your school here, not ours.)

Committee: EXCOMM 1962

Position: John F. Kennedy

There should be one position paper from each delegate touching on all topics, with a focus on that delegate's position in the committee.

Some Background

In 1962, John F. Kennedy assembled a group of advisors consisting of the National Security Council and others whose presence the President deemed necessary to address newfound CIA intelligence indicating the presence of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Cuba. With Cuba only about ninety miles south of Florida, the presence of these missiles represented a clear danger to American security. This gathered crowd, known as the Executive Committee or, more popularly, as EXCOMM, deliberated America's options in face of this threat.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, or USSR, were fragile long before the placement of these missiles. After World War II, the US emerged as the world's superpower. Its defensive capabilities, which included the atomic bomb, were unrivaled. American manufacturing accounted for half of the total output at the world. On the global level, the US became the leading voice within the international community.¹ But at the same time, the Soviet Union was expanding its own role as a world power. Soon after the war, the USSR under Stalin expanded its presence into most of Eastern Europe. It became clear that the Soviet Union's influence on the world posed a threat to American interests, both ideological and material.² On one level, the US's global presence and influence was threatened by the Soviet Union because its allies were limited to the capitalist nations of the world. As a result, American economic interests were also at stake as it did not engage in trade with communist nations.

Stalin, who had promised free elections, instead created pro-Communist Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe and showed no signs of stopping. Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously characterized the increasing divide between capitalist states and Soviet-controlled communist states an "Iron Curtain" that had divided the two.

The rise of communism in Eastern Europe caused much hysteria at home. Communists were labeled as anti-American totalitarians whose political agenda was antithetical to American freedom. In 1947, The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), a subcommittee in Congress, interrogated figures in Hollywood to investigate the suspicion of Communist influence in Hollywood. HUAC was noted for its aggressive and uncompromising mission to drive Communism out of the states. Ten

¹ Foner, 1001-1002

² Ibid, 1002

members who refused to comment based on their belief that the committee violated their First Amendment rights were blacklisted from the film industry for their unwillingness to cooperate. The most infamous example of Communist hysteria occurred during the Joe McCarthy trials. McCarthy, a Senator from Wisconsin, pursued a relentless anti-Communist crusade. Unlike HUAC, which focused on Hollywood, McCarthy ruled out no one in his pursuit. He prosecuted hundreds of individuals in various governmental departments and, by doing so, heightened hysteria throughout the nation.³

American policymakers did not take news of these Soviet satellite states lightly either. In “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” American diplomat George Kennan describes Soviet Union and its ultimate mission to spread communism across the world as the ultimate threat to the free-enterprise world. Kennan argued that the USSR would actively seek to dismantle free markets in favor of centralized ones if not properly contained.⁴ Under President Truman’s administration and those of subsequent Presidents, the United States developed an official policy for managing the Soviet threat known as “containment.” Containment sought not necessarily to remove Communist governments, but to actively prevent capitalist nations from falling to the hands of communism.

There were three main alternatives to containment.⁵ Through isolationism, one of the three, the United States would have retracted its influence and power it developed and exerted throughout the Cold War. Isolationism was popular among more conservative Americans. Another alternative, détente, promoted maintaining friendly nations with the USSR. Détente policies focused on deescalating tensions and relations, often with a

³ Ibid., 1024

⁴ Kennan, 1

⁵http://www.academia.edu/8785530/Containment_Americas_Default_Foreign_Policy_In_the_Cold_War_Era

particular emphasis on trade. A final alternative to containment was rollback, which promoted aggressive, proactive, and militaristic action aimed at shrinking the control of the Soviet Union. Although all of these methods were used at times during the Cold War, containment won out as the general strategy because it was a happy medium between aggression and caution. One form of containment was embodied by the Marshall Plan, during which the United States revitalized economic conditions in Europe after World War II and in doing so attempted to install rejuvenated capitalist states. Another form of containment was used later in the Cold War, when the US got involved in Vietnam on the grounds of containment, fearing that if Vietnam fell under Communist rule so would the rest of Asia.

On another front, availability of nuclear weaponry added an unprecedented dimension to the conflict. After World War II, both nations learned to create these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and were gradually increasing their stockpiles. The very notion of nuclear fallout as a result of amassing weapons prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in direct combat during the Cold War—hence “Cold War.” John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under Eisenhower, developed an aggressive retaliatory defense policy toward Soviet military action.⁶ Both sides were aware that military action would result in mutually assured destruction and thus were forced to act cautiously in proceedings with one another throughout the latter half of the 20th century. The term “Brinkmanship” describes this ongoing struggle in which both sides, through aggressive action, went up to the “brink” of mutually assured destruction but cautiously avoided going over it.

⁶ Foner, 1009

While both sides were cautious to never go over the “brink,” the United States and the Soviet Union tested the water through the 20th century. Both sides had vested interests in global, “Capitalism-versus-Communism” proxy wars, in which neither country ever actually initiated the conflicts. For example, a proxy war ensued in Korea, where North Korea was backed by the Soviets and South Korea by the Americans. In Vietnam, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong represented the interests of the USSR whereas the American interests were represented by the Southern Vietnamese forces.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the two powers ever came to nuclear fallout. Up until the crisis, the relationship between the US and Cuba gradually deteriorated. First, in 1960 Fidel Castro overthrew the American-backed Fulgencio Batista regime then ruling Cuba. Later in the year, Castro opened diplomatic ties with the USSR while ending both trade and diplomatic ties with the US. In response to Castro’s control over Cuba, Kennedy initiated the Bay of Pigs invasion, in which 1,500 trained Cuban exiles launched an attack aimed at overthrowing Castro’s government. The Bay of Pigs was a major disaster for the United States. Castro strengthened both his control over Cuba and his ties to the USSR while growing seriously distrustful toward the United States.⁷ Around the same time, Kennedy authorized the placement of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, which posed a direct threat toward the USSR.

Castro grew suspicious of another Bay of Pigs-like attack. The United States had also conducted other small-scale militaristic covert operations directed toward Cuba throughout this time.⁸ Furthermore, under Kennedy, US defense forces grew to

⁷http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/kennedy_cuban_missile_01.shtml#four

⁸ Ibid.

unprecedented levels.⁹ Given these factors, Castro requested the installation of Soviet missiles, and Moscow obliged to his request.

Khrushchev's Motive and Our Options

Much of EXCOMM's discussion centered on understanding Khrushchev's motive in placing missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev knew the dangers of brinkmanship and did not have a track record of unnecessary provocation, so why would he put the world in danger by installing these missiles? For one, Khrushchev could have used the Cuban missiles as diplomatic trade bait. As previously mentioned, the US had placed missiles potentially directed at the USSR in Turkey, and Khrushchev could have (and ultimately did) use the missiles in Cuba as a way to get rid of those in Turkey. Another idea proposed by George Ball was that Moscow was using these missiles as a means to annex West Berlin, which was entirely surrounded by the communist East Germany.¹⁰ Before considering America's response to this crisis, it is essential to know that Khrushchev is acting as a rational agent, and that there is likely a strategic reason for his actions.¹¹

In responding to Moscow, the United States made sure also to act rationally, reasonably, and justifiably.¹² Because the Cold War was categorized by global struggle between capitalism and communism, both nations were in a sense fighting over acceptance from the international community.¹³ As a result, the United States made sure

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/departmental/interpol/ddmi/gillespie_-_dynamics_of_trust_and_distrust.pdf

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

the international community, often represented through the United Nations, regarded any diplomatic or militaristic action the US undertook as reasonable and justifiable. Even if the US had liked to strike Cuba, for example, it could have only done so if the international community would sanction such an attack. That, in turn, meant that both nations had a reputation to uphold. The USSR had publicly supported Cuba on numerous occasions, just as Kennedy had committed his support to West Berlin. This public commitment is precisely why Kennedy was reluctant to engage militaristically.¹⁴ Khrushchev may have felt forced to retaliate had Kennedy attacked—be it through West Berlin or elsewhere.

International organizations played an important role during the Cold War. Formed during the rise of Soviet global influence, the North Atlantic Trade Organization, or NATO, consisted of North American capitalist nations. It served as a global player in the fight against communism. Many US-backed missions in the war were headed through NATO.¹⁵ NATO's militaristic strength came to prominence during the Korea conflict. Similarly, the United Nations had a role of significant global importance throughout the Cold War.

Most famously, the United Nations led the effort against communist North Korea's aggression toward South Korea. Furthermore, as the Cold War was a worldwide conflict, most countries, both communist and capitalist, had representation through this forum. Having both sides at the table often led to stalemate, especially in the Security Council. Either the Soviet Union or the United States would veto resolutions on controversial

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/418982/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization-NATO/218591/NATO-during-the-Cold-War>

matters, as evidenced by the Suez Canal conflict.¹⁶ It's important to consider ways in which America can work through and with the approval of these international bodies when considering its courses of action.

It serves our own best interest to act in a justifiable manner in the eyes of the international community to prevent the Soviet Union from potentially escalating the conflict. For example, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara suggested that the United States furtively remove missiles in Turkey and then attack Cuba.¹⁷ Such a move could potentially be justifiable because the Soviet Union would no longer have a legitimate reason for having those missiles in Cuba—of course, this may not have been the sole reason behind Khrushchev's decision.

Specific to this conflict, the United States has two broad routes: negotiate with Moscow or engage militaristically. As spelled out earlier, both scenarios require extensive research on Moscow's ulterior motives in placing the missiles in Cuba. Because this is a global conflict, any action in Cuba will have an effect on other conflicts around the world. When developing policy to deal with the crisis, it's crucial to consider ripple effect of our actions on other countries involved in US-Soviet conflict.

Questions to Consider

1. If the US pursues the diplomatic route, what price is it willing to pay for the removal of the missiles?

¹⁶ <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/10/the-un-during-the-cold-war-a-tool-of-superpower-influence-stymied-by-superpower-conflict/>

¹⁷ https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/departamental/interpol/ddmi/gillespie_-_dynamics_of_trust_and_distrust.pdf

2. In what ways can a diplomatic option and a militaristic option coexist?
3. How can the United States engage militaristically and still prevent a nuclear fallout?
4. How will the US deal with the situation in West Berlin? Keep in mind; the USSR may have placed missiles in Cuba as a means for annexing the city.
5. What's the best way to inform the American public of the situation in Cuba? So far, only members of EXCOMM are aware of the situation.

Outside Research

This background guide is meant only to serve as starting point. To successfully prepare for this conference, it's important that you do ample outside research as well. To get a feel for how EXCOMM went, check out the official transcripts of their meetings. Keep in mind that actual events that occurred when the meetings took place should be disregarded, as the events in our crisis will play out differently. The Cuban Missile Crisis, and, by extension, the Cold War, has been a topic of much scholarly attention. Many articles have been written on the topic in media sources like TIME, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal, just to name a few.

List of Positions

- **Secretary of State Dean Rusk:** He is an ardent believer in the use of military force in combating and containing communism; however, he had misgivings about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

- **Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon:** A former Undersecretary of State, he understands the importance of economic power in diplomacy, as well as the damage a long war could have on an economy. As such, he favors a swift strike to disarm the missiles, as well as a blockade.
- **Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara:** He is a proponent of using the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction to deter an attack, rather than relying on first-strike capabilities. He also supports flexible response strategy and the blockade option as well as increasing US military capabilities.
- **Attorney General Robert F Kennedy:** Robert Kennedy has an unusual role for an Attorney-General, as both a trusted advisor of his older brother and a diplomatic envoy with experience in the Berlin Crisis of 1961. He strongly supports covert action in Cuba and providing military aid to rebels. He was involved in several assassination attempts on Fidel Castro.
- **Mr. McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor:** A proponent of containment, McGeorge Bundy was also one of the main actors behind the Marshall Plan. His experience in foreign affairs makes him invaluable to EXCOMM. He also supports covert operations as a way of containing communism.
- **Director John McCone, Central Intelligence:** He disapproves of US attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. He was the first to alert the US that Soviets may have placed missiles on Cuba, prompting the flyover which took the pictures. He is a supporter of nuclear test bans.

- **General Maxwell D Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:** Taylor was a critic of Eisenhower's New Look policy, which was based on brinkmanship, and is head of the task force to determine what went wrong in Bay of Pigs.
- **Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson to the Soviet Union:** Ambassador Thompson is noted for his extensive knowledge of Soviet language, history and culture. Although he is wary that a blockade would lead to a strike, Thompson supports the blockade and is also urging Kennedy to order Khrushchev to dismantle the missiles in Cuba.
- **Mr. Ray S Cline, Head of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence:** Cline was among the first to predict the Soviet missile transfers to Cuba. As Head of the Directorate of Intelligence, he was also among the first to inform the President. He is an ardent supporter of Nitze's policy of active confrontation with the Soviet Union, as well as Eisenhower's New Look policies.
- **Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze for International Security Affairs:** Nitze is one of the principal architects and a major proponent of aggressive containment. He often speaks out against demilitarization or pursuing arms controls agreements with the USSR and is sometimes considered contradictory or inconsistent in his positions.
- **Director Edward A McDermott, Office of Emergency Planning:** Edward McDermott is a staffer who has worked with Kennedy since his years in the House. He is noncommittal, and is focused on keeping the American people safe, rather than holding any large overarching theory of combating communism.

- **Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to the United Nations:** Known for his cautious, sometimes even pacifistic policies, Stevenson speaks out against any form of confrontation with the Soviet Union or Cuba. He prefers direct negotiation with Moscow over any other route.
- **General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air:** General LeMay is notable for his aggressive militaristic leanings. He is pushing for strikes on missile sites and arguing against a blockade or any other peaceful alternative.
- **Admiral George Wheelan Anderson Jr., Chief of Naval Operations:** Anderson strongly supports limited military action against Cuba and the blockade method. However, his relationship with Robert MacNamara is contentious, and the two do not work well together.
- **Admiral Edwin J Roland, Commandant of the US Coast Guard:** Like McDermott, Roland's priority is securing the United States against attack rather than thwarting communism. He is a proponent of direct military action against Cuba but also wants further naval assistance in defending American shores. He also has a close relationship with C. Douglas Dillon.

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