



Boston University Academy Model United Nations Conference VII

Saturday, February 2nd to Sunday, February 3rd, 2019

Boston University Academy

Boston, MA



Historical UNSC

Hello, Delegates!


My name is Amy Fung, and it is my pleasure to welcome you to the 2019 BUAMUN conference. I am currently a senior at Boston University Academy, and I will be your chair for our simulation of the historical United Nations Security Council. Anna Dzhitenov, a junior at Boston University Academy, will serve as your co-chair.

Model UN may seem challenging, but it can also be a fun and rewarding opportunity to hone your diplomatic, analytic, and creative skills, as well as to meet and interact with like-minded peers.

With that being said, your experience at BUAMUN will be largely dependent upon your levels of commitment and preparation. It is highly encouraged, if not expected, for you to do thorough research on your topics ahead of time. Although this background guide will provide you with general information about the topics at hand, it is a mere starting point; the responsibility of conducting detailed, in-depth research ultimately falls upon you, and this is crucial to do.

Please do not hesitate to reach out to us with any questions or concerns that may arise between now and the conference. Anna and I look forward to working with all of you. Good luck, and we will see you in February!

Best,
Amy Fung
BU Academy '19
amyfung@bu.edu



Committee Information

Following World War II, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established after the failure of the League of Nations. The UNSC's primary goal is the maintenance of international peace and security, as per Article One of the United Nations charter. It is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is unique in that it is the only body of the UN with the power to issue binding resolutions to its member states.

The committee is composed of 15 member-states, five of which are permanent members: the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States. These five members represent the Allied powers of World War II and hold the greatest power on the committee as they have the ability to veto any resolution. The remaining ten positions are held by rotating, elected members who each hold two-year terms. These rotating members are chosen based on geographical location. The African bloc is represented by three members, the Latin America and the Caribbean, Asian, and Western European and Others blocs by two each, and the Eastern European bloc by one.

In addition to its role in peacekeeping, the UNSC also plays an important role in governing certain parts of the United Nations, such as recommending new member states and judges for the International Court of Justice.

The 2019 Historical United Nations Security Council will simulate the events of the world beginning on January 1st of 1992. Delegates will be bound to the political realities of the time. No references or considerations are to be made regarding events beyond this date. In addition, the nations in the committee will reflect those belonging to the UNSC in 1992: the five permanent members, Austria, Belgium, Cabo Verde, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Japan, Morocco, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

Topic I: The Breakup of Yugoslavia

Background

1918 to 1980: Origins and Tito's Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia



Yugoslavia was initially created after World War I and the Balkan Wars when Croat, Slovene, and Bosnian territories that had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire united with the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro. It dissolved during World War II with the establishment of a Nazi-allied independent Croat state but was reunited in 1945 under Josip Broz Tito.

Tito was a communist and modeled his country after the Soviet Union. In 1946, the new constitution of Yugoslavia, now the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, established the country as a Socialist state and a federation of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. It also included Vojvodina and Kosovo, two autonomous provinces within Serbia. The communist Yugoslavia initially allied with the Eastern Bloc, a group of communist states under the authority of the Soviet Union. However, due to ideological disagreements and conflicts with Josef Stalin, Tito distanced Yugoslavia from the communist states, and Yugoslavia was expelled from the bloc in 1948. Consequently, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia's ruling party, became the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SJK).

Although Tito's separation from the Eastern Bloc was perceived to be a setback, it eventually provided Tito and Yugoslavia with prestige and allies. After his expulsion from the communist states, Tito continued to criticize not only the Soviet Union but also other nations of the Eastern Bloc as well as those of the noncommunist Western Bloc. In 1961, these neutral sentiments helped Yugoslavia gain worldwide recognition as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group that aimed to ensure the "national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security" of non-aligned countries, or countries not formally aligned with

or against either bloc. Tito became known for setting Yugoslavia upon an individual, unique path.

Notably, under Tito, Yugoslavia developed Titoism, a new form of communism considered to be a model for market socialism, and it had a society more open than that of its communist neighbors. Tito strived to unite state, capital, and labor and to put an end to the ethnic strife and competition that had previously led to the Balkan Wars. During this period, divisions between groups were largely kept under control, as Tito suppressed nationalism, often by force. Yugoslav citizens generally lived in peace under Tito, and there was a degree of intermarriage between the different groups, especially in the cities.

In contrast to the violent, gruesome wars prior to Tito's reign, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia appeared to be a prosperous paradise. Tito seemed to have resolved the various national and ethnic issues that had catalyzed violence, and the country provided its citizens with relatively high living standards. The Yugoslav government also allowed its citizens various freedoms—such as the ability to travel to the west freely for either work or pleasure—not granted to citizens of nearby communist countries.

But despite the apparent prosperity and peace of Tito's Yugoslavia, much of the country's early success was an illusion. Its economy was built upon the unstable foundation of massive western loans: Yugoslavia's debt was equal to \$21 billion U.S. dollars. Moreover, in general, its supposed ethnic and cultural unity was merely an illusion resulting from suppression of differences. Yet, even with its underlying tensions and debt, under the rule of Tito, Yugoslavia maintained a largely successful appearance and reputation.

1980-1987: Initial Descent into Chaos

However, Yugoslavia's political, economic, and cultural issues could not remain concealed and controlled forever. Yugoslav citizens had prepared for Tito's demise with the slogan "After Tito, Tito." But following Tito's death in 1980, there was no new Tito. Yugoslavia had lost its unifying force. Without Tito, problems that had been suppressed during his reign emerged and worsened, and the state began to unravel.

Despite previous efforts to ease the differences between ethnic and cultural groups, their divergent interests had not been truly reconciled and were only exacerbated after Tito's death. Nationalism grew among individual republics as their governments began to exercise powers that were due to them under the constitution but had previously been suppressed by Tito. Dissent began to grow, and conflicts between the republics arose rapidly. Serbs complained of persecution by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Croats and Slovenes resented the fact that money earned in their republics subsidised poorer parts of Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo. Albanians there demonstrated for their own republic, and even for secession and union with Albania.

The country's economy fared little better than its sense of unity. Yugoslavia's previously weak, inefficient economy only further deteriorated. It lacked a workable public finance system, and disparities worsened in levels of economic development and standards of living between the different regions in Yugoslavia. The state's heaps of debt only grew.

1987-1991: Milosevic and Nationalism

As a result of Yugoslavia's desolate state, its citizens began to question the legitimacy of their government, particularly its system of Titoism. The numerous problems that arose from the country's heavy indebtedness, corruption, and poverty brewed in Yugoslav citizens feelings of resentment toward the communist elites who had drastically mismanaged the economy. The general weakening of the Eastern Bloc further contributed to this newfound attitude toward communism.

Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, preyed upon the resurfacing of Serbian nationalism, the festering, nationwide unease, and the high ethnic tensions and viewed them as means to gain power. Milosevic, who was once a strict communist, has not formally confirmed his stance on nationalism, the support of which was a political crime in Yugoslavia. However, he is widely considered to have exploited Serbian nationalism for his own benefit. Milosevic and his use of nationalism as a political weapon ignited a series of events that drove the bleak state of Yugoslavia into further disarray. Yugoslavia lacked an institutional structure capable of resolving its destabilising economic, political, and cultural problems. The country was incapable of retaining Yugoslav unity in the face of central nationalist forces such as that of Milosevic. As a result of these problems, during the 1980s, Yugoslavia faced an economic and political crisis. Coupled with the global fall of communism, the crisis destabilised the country and now threatens to impair its existence. By the end of the decade, the country's economy was only further afflicted by debt, antagonism, high unemployment, and food shortages.


Milosevic rose to power by opposing the aforementioned autonomous provinces of Serbia, as he believed Belgrade, Serbia's capital, had little control over the politics in these areas. Of the two provinces, Kosovo drew the most ethnic tensions and discontentment. Kosovo's largely Albanian population expressed growing resentment against what they perceived as the privileged position of Serbs and Montenegrins in the province and against Kosovo's subordination to Serbian republican officials in Belgrade. In turn, Serbs in Kosovo feared oppression from the provincial government, which was composed mostly of ethnic Albanians. Seizing upon the sensitive, controversial issue of Kosovo, Milosevic fed the fears and nationalism of Serbs in order to mobilize their support. He abandoned traditional communist neutrality and asserted that ethnic Albanian authorities in Kosovo had abused their powers, that the province's autonomy was allowing the entrenchment of separatism, and that the rights of the Serbs in Kosovo were violated regularly. Proposing a solution to his diagnosis of Kosovo's autonomy as a threat to Serbia, Milosevic advocated the reduction of Kosovo's autonomy, the protection of minority Serb rights, and an end to separatism in Kosovo.

Although Milosevic initially wished to dominate all of Yugoslavia's territories, he eventually realized the improbability of such an aim, and he and his allies sought instead to "cleanse" Yugoslavia of non-Serbs in order to establish a mighty "Greater Serbia." He promised power, reforms, and protection for all Serbs. Milosevic portrayed himself to Serbs as a necessary leader who shared his people's concerns, would voice their frustrations, and would effect change. Using this platform, Milosevic rose to power and harnessed support among Serbs rapidly.

Through a series of rallies and street protests known as the anti-bureaucratic revolution, Milosevic and his demonstrators successfully attained their nationalist goals. In 1988, Milosevic and his allies ousted the provincial leadership of not only Kosovo but also that of the province of Vojvodina. The leaders of these regions were replaced with Milosevic's allies. Then, in 1989, led by Milosevic, Serbia adopted constitutional amendments that allowed its government to reassert effective power over Kosovo and Vojvodina; Milosevic had essentially abolished the autonomy of both provinces.

After its success in these two areas, in January 10th, 1989, the revolution continued in the republic of Montenegro, where the unemployment rate was nearly 25 percent, and a fifth of its population lived below the poverty line. Approximately 50,000 demonstrators protested the republic's economic situation and called for the resignation of its leadership. The very next day, the resignations of Montenegro's state presidency and of its delegates in the SJK were announced. Although sufficient evidence of his organizing the protest in Montenegro is lacking, demonstrators were seen holding images of Milosevic and were heard chanting his name.

Ethnic composition of Kosovo 1991



Regardless of whether he played an organizing role in this particular protest, had it not been for Milosevic's starting the anti-bureaucratic revolution, his severe nationalist sentiments, or his previous success in Kosovo and Vojvodina, the overthrow of Montenegro's leadership would not have been possible. With this ousting, Milosevic effectively created a voting bloc for Serbia; it had four of eight votes.

Serbia's growing power was not overlooked by the other republics, which reacted by strengthening their own nationalist movements. By 1990, communism in the state had collapsed, and Yugoslavia moved to multi-party pluralism and elections for the first time. Rather than reelecting formerly communist politicians, Yugoslavs brought to power instead politicians with nationalist platforms. Each promised to work in the interest of his individual republic and to advance his own people. After witnessing the success of Serbia in overpowering not only provinces but even a republic, the other republics sought nationalism for themselves as a means of protection from Serbia. As each republic's citizens grew more nationalist, a sense of competition and a need for self-defense were fostered among citizens of other republics, who would in turn make strides to grow additionally nationalist, and the cycle continued. Thus, a spiral of increasingly competitive and mutually fearful nationalisms began to overcome Yugoslavia.

But despite the expansion of nationalism in the country, no republic harbored enough nationalist sentiment to aim for outright secession, not even Slovenia and Croatia, the two most independent and prosperous regions of Yugoslavia. Both rejected Yugoslavia's old federal structure, yet they desired not to secede but to transform Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of sovereign states. However, if such a transformation was a failure, Slovenia and Croatia would have to resort to secession; they would rather separate from the state than live under the accumulating, threatening power of Serbia. In December of 1990, the Slovenian Parliament stated that if such a solution was not found and established within the next six months, Slovenia would unilaterally proclaim its independence. Croatia stated it would do likewise.

The primary obstacle in negotiating this matter was the issue of Serbia; 25 percent of Serbs lived outside the borders of Serbia. Milosevic proposed a remodelled federation, in which the dispersed Serbian population remained united in a single state, and in which Serbs had a political influence corresponding to their position as Yugoslavia's largest ethnic group. He further argued that although it may secede from Yugoslavia, Croatia could not take its Serb areas along with it. Ultimately, no agreement was reached on the idea of a new form of federation, for no proposal could accommodate the interests of all. In particular, Serbia's interests collided with those of Slovenia and Croatia.

Croatia's government had echoed the Slovenian government's threats of secession, but the natures of their respective struggles for independence differed significantly. Only 2 percent of Slovenia's population consisted of Serbs, compared to Croatia's 12 percent. Croatia's independence would tear its Serb population from Yugoslavia against their will. Furthermore, by deciding to impose from 1990 to 1991 a militant regime in Serb-controlled regions, involving the formation of Croatian military units and the widespread sacking of Serbs from both public and

private enterprises, the Croatian government disregarded the legitimate claims and history of the Serbs. Given this violent and unpredictable regime, Milosevic encouraged Croatian Serbs to arm themselves.

1991-1992: The Beginning of the Yugoslav Wars

On June 25th, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared their independence, disregarding warnings by both the European Community and the United States that their independence would not be recognized. By the next morning, the Serb-controlled Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was rapidly approaching Slovenia. The Slovenians responded by organizing barricades and demonstrations. By this time, the Slovenian government had seized control of both the international Ljubljana Airport and Slovenia's border posts on its borders with Italy, Austria, and Hungary. In the Slovenian War of Independence, the JNA failed to achieve even the relatively accessible aim of seizing Slovenia's border crossings. The Slovenians had prepared well for potential conflict, and the JNA operation was mismanaged, but the main cause to which Slovenia's success can be attributed derives from Milosevic. He had already accepted the secession of Slovenia, a region with few Serbs, and he deployed a modest amount of JNA troops for the operation.

Presenting the Brijuni Agreement on July 7th of 1991, Lord Carrington of the European Economic Community (EEC) pressured Slovenia and Croatia to place a three-month moratorium on their independence. During this three month ceasefire, the Yugoslav Army retreated from Slovenia. Negotiations to restore the Yugoslav federation with Lord Carrington and other members of the EEC were all but ended. Carrington's plan realized that Yugoslavia was in a state of dissolution and reasoned that each republic must accept the independence of the others. It included a promise to Milosevic that the EEC would ensure the protection of Serbs outside of Serbia.

Milosevic rejected the Brijuni Agreement, as he claimed that the EEC lacked the authority to dissolve Yugoslavia, and that dissolution countered Serbia's interests, as it would divide the Serb population into four republics. Carrington responded by initiating a vote on the matter. With the exception of Serbia, all the republics, including Montenegro under Momir Bulatovic, initially voted in favor of the Brijuni Agreement. However, after Serbia pressured the Montenegrin president, Montenegro changed its position to oppose the Agreement.

Thus, the Croatian War of Independence commenced. In stark contrast to the short, relatively moderate Slovenian War of Independence, also known as the "Ten-Day War", the Croatian War of Independence is ongoing and resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 within a mere six months of combat. Whereas the war in Slovenia began with the republic's declaration of independence, the war in Croatia began months earlier, when tensions between the Croatian government and rebel, ethnic Croatian Serbs erupted in brutal force. Croatian Serbs conquered Croatian territory and established the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (SAO Krajina), a self-proclaimed Serbian autonomous region within Croatia. On April 1st, the SAO Krajina declared its plan to secede from Croatia. After Croatia announced its independence, Croatian

Serbs conquered other regions and established the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem as well as the SAO Western Slavonia. These three areas eventually joined to form the Republic of Serbian Krajina that December.

The JNA and the Croatian Serb paramilitary forces, often assisted by Serbian paramilitary allies, collaborated in fighting the Croats. Both proponents of Serbia and of Croatia spread propaganda and mongered fear against their opponents to mobilize support in their communities.

In the beginning months of the war, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army and navy deliberately attacked civilian areas of Split and Dubrovnik, a UNESCO world heritage site, as well as nearby Croat villages. Although Yugoslav media claimed the actions were executed due to a presence of fascist Ustaše forces and international terrorists in the city, UN investigations disproved this claim. Milo Dukanovic, then prime minister of Montenegro and an ally of Milosevic, garnered Montenegrin support for the capture of Dubrovnik by appealing to the republic's nationalism. He promised that the seizing of Dubrovnik would permit the expansion of Montenegro into the city, which he claimed was historically part of Montenegro.

January-March of 1992: Current Situation



After the failure of the negotiations made by the EEC, the U.N. was invited to mediate. Former United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was named Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and he proposed a plan to resolve conflict in Croatia. The plan proposed a ceasefire, the protection of civilians in areas designated as UN Protected Areas and a UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia. As of January 1st, 1992, Vance's plan consists of one agreement: the Geneva Accord. The Accord was a precondition for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force. It comprised four provisions: the end of Croatian blockade of JNA barracks, the withdrawal of JNA personnel and equipment from Croatia, the implementation of a ceasefire, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. It was signed in Geneva, Switzerland on November 23rd, 1991 by Milosevic, who saw the deployment of UN troops as a method to consolidate his military gains in Croatia, Yugoslav defense minister General Veljko Kadijevic, and Croatian President Franjo Tudman.

By December 15th, UNSC Resolution 724 was unanimously adopted to carry out the peacekeeping operation. A Security Council committee was created to deliberate issues

regarding the arms embargo, and it was recommended that the Secretary General launch humanitarian efforts in Yugoslavia. However, the resolution also noted that the republics had violated the conditions of the Accord. The final obstacle impeding the agreement was the Croatian blockade of the remaining JNA barracks. With its lifting on December 25th, the conditions for the implementation of the ceasefire were finally met.

But although Vance's plan may offer hope for a peaceful future, the conflict in Yugoslavia is far from resolved. The peacekeeping force has yet to be deployed, and any party may violate the Accord before the March deployment. Furthermore, the Accord was not a conclusion or a political settlement but a mere pause in Yugoslavia's chaos. The Croatian War for Independence has yet to end, and Yugoslav citizens throughout the republics continue to face poverty as well as collisions with other republics and groups. Yugoslavia's central issues were left unresolved and paused; they will remain until a proper political solution is found.

Furthermore, Vance's plan address issues only in the republic of Croatia, while the other republics remain in varying states of turmoil and some are on the brink of war. For example, a potential crisis looms over Bosnia-Herzegovina, which faces the dilemma of whether or not to secede. Its government must choose between remaining in Yugoslavia, which entails continued domination by Serbs over Bosnia's Croats and Muslims, or claiming independence, which would take 1.3 million Serbs out of their country against their will. Furthermore, the Serbs and the Croats within Bosnia included the most militant nationalists of these two nations, and both have begun preparations for aggression. The two groups have long been arming themselves, have started to form 'autonomous regions', and have been negotiating secretly over which territories to conquer in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Thus, in 1992, the fates of Vance's plan, of the potential Bosnian war, of the Croatian War, and of the future of Yugoslavia will be determined. These fates will be based upon numerous events and factors, some of the most significant of which are the decisions at which members of the UN arrive. The circumstances surrounding the unraveling of Yugoslavia are complex, interwoven, and controversial. Members of the UNSC must consider these circumstances and more in their decision-making. It is imperative for the UN and the international community to take appropriate action and to aid in finding an end to this conflict.

Questions to Consider

- Would recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as independent entities help or harm the Yugoslav peace process?
- Has your country had any past relationship with Yugoslavia?
- What form of international support (ex. diplomatic, economic, etc.) is needed the most in Yugoslavia right now? Does it vary by region?
- Considering the wrongdoings of both the Croatian and the Serbian governments in the Croatian War for Independence, does your country favor one side or the other? Should aid be offered to the Croats or to the Serbs, if it is offered at all? Should either force face punishment? Should both?

- On a similar note, does your country support or oppose any of the republics? Is it possible to support only select republics, or would doing so only foster discontent and contribute to further nationalism and violence for all?
- Should the UNSC exact punishment upon any of the actors in the Yugoslav Wars? If so, which actors? How and when should the punishment(s) be inflicted?
- Can you identify a single, main cause for the descent of Yugoslavia? If so, can actions be taken to address the issue? Or is any action taken now too late? Or, perhaps, was action inconsequential even earlier? If you cannot identify a main cause, do you believe the breakup of Yugoslavia is inevitable? Why or why not?
- In relation to the previous question, is it possible for the republics to coexist peacefully without a dictator to suppress their differences? Was Yugoslav unity a myth and Yugoslavia an artificial proxy state? Without dictatorship, is the collapse of Yugoslavia inevitable? If you believe dictatorship is necessary to maintain Yugoslavia, do you believe the revival of the nation warrants the instillation of a dictator?
- Consider that the republics hold varying levels of support for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and that although no republic wished to secede, they could not agree upon a form of federation that would satisfy all the republics' interest. Given this information, the tensions of the formerly united Yugoslavia, and the violence that resulted from previous attempts at secession, does your country support the reunification of Yugoslavia? Why or why not? If so, how can reunification be successfully established? Is total reunification possible? If your country does not support reunification, which entities should secede, if any? Should they all? Can dissolution occur peacefully?
- In the past, negotiations and peace treaties have failed to resolve the urgent issues of Yugoslavia. How can future peace proposals be more effective? Is Vance's plan effective? Is it a step in the right direction? Or is it a fruitless attempt at help that fails to address the true, pressing concerns of the state? Can the entirety of Yugoslavia possibly reach and maintain peaceful agreement?
- Tito established Yugoslavia as a communist state, while Milosevic established it as a nationalist one. Under different circumstances and/or management, could either of these political systems be suitable for Yugoslavia? For another nation? If not, in what political system does your country see Yugoslavia succeeding? Can it succeed?

Bloc Positions

African Bloc:

1. Cabo Verde

Although Yugoslavia and Cabo Verde have little history, Cabo Verde follows a policy of nonalignment and seeks cooperative relations with all friendly states. It is actively interested in foreign affairs and highly values international peace and security. This nation has urged its UNSC members to prevent bloodshed rather than react to it and its aftermath. It is likely to support notions of interference, particularly peacekeeping missions.

Cabo Verde is among 52 of the 55 African countries in 1992 to be members of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group in which Yugoslavia was a founding member. Cabo Verde may hold Yugoslavia in special regard for this reason.

2. Morocco

There are various factors influencing Morocco's foreign relations, including considerations of immigration, global identity, and foreign policy support. Regarding the latter, Morocco often gains financial support from the countries it assists. It has a history of supporting the United States and conversely receiving the United States' financial support. The actions of the United States will likely influence those of Morocco.

Like Cabo Verde, Morocco is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and could potentially sympathize with Yugoslavia, its history, and its existence for this reason.

3. Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a current member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group in which Yugoslavia was a founding member. Yugoslavia's involvement with the Non-Aligned Movements appears to have strengthened Zimbabwe's sympathy for the multinational state. Beyond this connection, it should be noted that Zimbabwe's government approaches the prospect of foreign interference cautiously and tends to avoid intervention unless absolutely necessary.

Asia-Pacific Bloc:

1. China

Relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Serbia date back to 1949, while diplomatic relations between the two countries were formally established in 1955. China has an embassy in Belgrade; Serbia has an embassy in Beijing and a consulate-general in Shanghai.

In the past, the PRC has supported Milosevic and Serbia. It believes that by overthrowing Kosovo's leaders and stripping the province of its autonomy, Milosevic was acting to prevent the secession of Kosovo by Albanian separatists from Yugoslavia. China saw Milosevic as a leader preserving his country.

China has previously opposed forceful intervention under the belief that such interference could set a dangerous precedent. Its government reasoned that this could potentially afflict the PRC, should uprisings occur and result in further destruction from international forces.

2. India

India and Yugoslavia were both founding members of the Non-Alignment Movement in 1961. The two countries developed a fairly close relationship during the Cold War, when both non-aligned countries sought peaceful coexistence among nations.

Indian leaders have emphasized that foreign intervention is illegitimate when a situation is domestic and internal and legitimate when there is sufficient implication of international danger. India's government has also expressed in the past that foreign action should only be taken with the consent and request of the authorities in question.

3. Japan

The countries of Japan and Yugoslavia have maintained bilateral relations for decades, even though Japan belonged to the Western Bloc, and Yugoslavia first belonged to the Eastern Bloc and then no bloc at all. Arguably, Yugoslavia has been more an ally of the East than the West. But despite apparent ideological differences, Japan and Yugoslavia have developed a friendly relationship. Yugoslavia was among the first communist countries to sign a trade treaty with Japan in 1959 and also to form a committee for its expansion of trade relations in 1972. In addition, on the diplomatic level, the two countries have exchanged numerous visits at high levels of government. In 1968, President Tito visited Japan; in 1976, members of the Japanese Imperial Family, Prince Akihito and Princess Michiko, visited Yugoslavia, the first visit to a communist country by any member of the Imperial Family.

In the mid-1950s, Yugoslavia was in a particularly difficult period; its relationships with both superpowers had deteriorated, and it had yet to found the Non-Alignment Movement. Thus, the state welcomed relations with Japan. Throughout the decade, Japan provided investment loans for the construction and development of Yugoslav plants.

Japan created committees for improving trade relations with the communist countries of Eastern Europe. The first committee which was established was the Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee in 1965. Members were representatives from economic institutions and social organizations, which differed depending upon the country with which Japan was trading.

Clearly, the Japanese and Yugoslav governments have no qualms and demonstrate a history of peaceful collaboration. But although relations with Yugoslavia were not insignificant to Japan, they were not among Japan's highest foreign policy priorities either. As with most governments, the Japanese government tends to work in its own interest. Even the nation's most apparently selfless actions, such as its supplying Yugoslavia with loans, can serve alternate, self-seeking purposes: to further its own economy and to develop relations with countries outside of the Western bloc. Japan directed itself toward these two goals especially in the mid-1900s, when Japan's bilateral relations with Yugoslavia were initiated, when the Cold War began, and when Japan was struggling to recover from military defeat and international humiliation. In its decision-making, the Japanese government may thus be influenced by East-West relations or by the resources of Yugoslavia or its allies.

However with all that being said, the focus of Japan's foreign policy could possibly shift now. The Cold War has ended and Japan has gained economic strength and a reputation as one of the world's major powers. Japan may be more open to active foreign policy and peacebuilding.

Eastern European Bloc:

1. Hungary

During World War II, Hungary was one of several countries to invade and occupy Yugoslav territories. Hungary occupied and annexed the Bačka, Baranja, Međimurje and Prekmurje regions of Yugoslavia. The occupation grew violent, as Hungarian occupation troops massacred civilians during raids. The two countries have yet to formally reconcile.

2. Russian Federation

Although Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were initially amicable and closely aligned, their relationship was severed after Yugoslavia's split from the Eastern Bloc and its founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. Furthermore, given the crises the Soviet Union has recently experienced and the crises Russia is currently experiencing, the issues in Yugoslavia may appear insignificant. The Soviet Union collapsed a mere day ago, and Russia is in a state of turmoil and pandemonium. A year prior to its dissolution, the USSR was already in crisis. It is likely to experience soon an era of dramatic political transform and uncertainty in the global policy area. This may be accompanied by economic, political, and social chaos, marked by declining economic output and increasing inflation, foreign debt, and budget deficits. Thus, Russia may not demonstrate much interest in providing others with support unless it itself benefits.

Latin American and Caribbean Bloc:

1. Ecuador

Ecuador has advocated for the reunification of the states. It stated that it would not support any modifications of borders brought about through the use of force and that it believes a peaceful solution that does not undermine the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia's republics should be sought. It also supported placing an embargo on the sale of weapons in Yugoslavia.

2. Venezuela

Venezuela has little formal history with Yugoslavia. However, relations between the United States and Venezuela have traditionally been close, and the actions of the United States may aid in determining those of Venezuela. Historically, Venezuela has often opposed foreign intervention. Serbia is represented in Venezuela through its embassy in Brasilia. Venezuela is represented in Serbia through its embassy in Belgrade, Serbia.

Western European and Others Bloc:

1. Austria

Austria has historic, religious, and cultural ties with Slovenia and Croatia. It is possible Austria is more inclined than other countries are to be sympathetic to these states' ambitions for self-determination within some sort of loose confederation.

Austrian representatives have declared full support of the EEC and CSCE's attempts at establishing peace. Austria is a proponent of peacemaking efforts and believes such efforts ought to be supported by the international community as a whole, as the world has a responsibility to put an end to the armed conflict in Yugoslavia. But the same time, the Austrian government holds that the European regional organizations must learn to manage their own responsibilities.

2. Belgium

Although the two countries have a limited history, Belgium has expressed a desire to instill peace in Yugoslavia. It seems to harbor a particular concern for peace and security in Central and Eastern Europe. Due to its proximity to Yugoslavia, this country may be eager to intervene and bring an end to the violence soon.

3. France

France (as well as the United Kingdom) desires to maintain Yugoslavian unity, and in this desire, it has generally supported Serbia's views on a remodelled federation. France, in addition to the United States and the United Kingdom, holds that recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as independent would only stimulate further ethnic tension throughout the remaining portions of the federation, leading to increased fighting and encouraging other republics to secede. In addition, they argue that recognition now will only encourage other separatist movements in Eastern Europe and the dissolved Soviet Union, further increasing instability of the area. The two contended that recognition should come only after a satisfactory settlement of the problems associated with Yugoslavia's disintegration is reached.

However, recently, France has backed down on its views for the sake of political strategy. Germany's acknowledgement of Slovenia and Croatia's independence contradicted France's proclaimed beliefs, but the French government considered its alliance with Germany too significant to its European policy to risk animosity with the country. Originally, France and Britain had aimed to use the Security Council to thwart German Foreign Minister Genscher's pledge to recognize Croatia and Slovenia by Christmas, an action that they have said will only inflame ethnic passions further and dampen the chances of peace. Their plan was to order as many as 100 United Nations military observers into Yugoslavia in advance of the UNSC meeting in Brussels to bolster a crumbling ceasefire agreement, one of many in the war. In addition, they wanted to condemn any "political action" likely to increase tensions and to tighten an embargo on selling arms to the warring parties. But because France and the United Kingdom wished to avoid disagreement with a useful political force, they withdrew their initial plan, and the actual adopted resolution sent a feeble force of 18 to 20 military, police, and political observers to Yugoslavia. And although it urged everyone to avoid actions that might increase tensions, the resolution no longer spoke of "political" actions, which would link the Council's warning more specifically to diplomatic recognition and Germany. Thus, France may act based upon the decisions of other council members, particularly those with which it has previously been aligned.

4. United Kingdom

Much like France, the United Kingdom hopes to maintain Yugoslavian unity and has generally supported Serbia's views on a remodelled federation. It holds that recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as independent would only serve to stimulate further ethnic tension throughout the remaining portions of the federation, leading to increased conflict and encouraging other republics to secede. In addition, the United Kingdom believes that recognition of the seceded states' independence now will only encourage other separatist movements in Eastern Europe and the dissolved Soviet Union, further increasing instability in the area. The two contended that recognition should come only after a satisfactory settlement of the problems associated with Yugoslavia's disintegration is reached.

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that, against a background of suffering, bereavement and much fear for the future, the Security Council's aim had not been to interfere or to try to impose a solution. Rather, it had sought to respond to the pleas of the Yugoslav parties

to help them to find a peaceful way through their differences. Although the conflict in Yugoslavia was being handled as a European matter, it was believed that the unique authority of the Council was needed to emphasize that this was an international concern with stakes and implications going wider than Yugoslavia alone. The speaker pointed out that the conflict under discussion had a strong international dimension and that the patchwork of nationalities and minorities throughout Central and Eastern Europe meant that full-scale war might not easily be confined to a single territory.

However, following the initiative of France, the United Kingdom also suppressed its views in the name of political strategy. Germany's acknowledgement of Slovenia and Croatia's independence contradicted the United Kingdom's beliefs, but the United Kingdom wished to avoid dissent with both Germany and France, two powerful nations. In addition, the resolution the United Kingdom had wished to adopt with France may have been more difficult to bring about alone. Originally, the two countries had aimed to use the Security Council to thwart German Foreign Minister Genscher's pledge to recognize Croatia and Slovenia by Christmas, an action that they have said will only inflame ethnic passions further and dampen the chances of peace. Their plan was to order as many as 100 United Nations military observers into Yugoslavia in advance of the UNSC meeting in Brussels to bolster a crumbling ceasefire agreement, one of many in the war. In addition, they wanted to condemn any "political action" likely to increase tensions and to tighten an embargo on selling arms to the warring parties. But because both countries wished to avoid disagreement with a useful political force, they withdrew their plan, and the actual adopted resolution sent a feeble force of 18 to 20 military, police, and political observers to Yugoslavia. Although it urged everyone to avoid actions that might increase tensions, the resolution no longer spoke of "political" actions, which would link the Council's warning more specifically to diplomatic recognition and Germany. Thus, much like France, the United Kingdom may act based upon the decisions of other council members, particularly those with which it has previously been aligned.

5. United States

In the past, the U.S. has provided Yugoslavia with financial assistance. The U.S.-controlled International Monetary Fund and World Bank granted Yugoslavia sizeable loans. The United States' support of Yugoslavia was founded on its own interests. To the U.S., Yugoslavia served to encourage socialist states to assert and maintain independence, to promote the development of alternate non-Soviet models of socialist development, and to bolster stability in the historically turbulent area. Yugoslavia, as the only defector from what the Americans believed to be a homogeneous system of the communist bloc, became not an affectionate ally, but rather a tool to undermine the Soviet bloc and destroy communism.

However, relations between the United States and Yugoslavia deteriorated around the end of the Cold War. The U.S. initiated sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1990 in the form of the Nickels Amendment, which was instrumental in denying Yugoslavia's last IMF loans shortly before the country's hyperinflation crisis and breakup. During the weakening of the Soviet Union and especially now, after its dissolution on December 31st, 1991, the United States no longer

had any use for Yugoslavia. In the absence of the USSR, the United States no longer needs an example of an independent socialist state, and Yugoslavia is no longer capable of bolstering stability.

Furthermore, in the past, the Pentagon and the State Department have consistently opposed the use of American ground forces—with the exception of peace-keepers—after a stable peace is established. The United States is not likely to invest long-term commitment into the Yugoslav Wars: too few interests are at stake, the characteristics of the war are not conducive to U.S. strategy, and the risk of casualties is high. In addition, with the upcoming 1992 presidential election in mind, President George H.W. Bush has no desire to take drastic, controversial action.

However, the United States has expressed concern for the degree of violence in Yugoslavia as well as the possibility of the violence spreading beyond the country. Although the U.S. government is unlikely to endorse any extreme actions, it may support moderate, agreeable motions such as additional humanitarian aid or peacekeeping missions.

Regarding the republics' independence, in response to the German decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, President Bush has voiced his disagreement and his view that the Yugoslav situation was "fraught with danger." He supports a "peaceful evolution" and the past actions of the EEC and of the U.N. Echoing the sentiments of France and the United Kingdom, the United States argues that acknowledging Slovenia and Croatia as independent would only serve to stimulate further ethnic tension throughout the remaining portions of the federation, leading to increased conflict and encouraging other republics to secede. In addition, the U.S. believes that recognition of the seceded states' independence now will only encourage other separatist movements in Eastern Europe and the dissolved Soviet Union, further increasing instability in the area. Recognition should come only after a satisfactory settlement of the problems associated with Yugoslavia's disintegration is reached.

Works Cited

- Analysis by the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry of Chinese-Albanian and Chinese-Yugoslav Relations*. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1963.
- “Balkans War: a Brief Guide.” *BBC News*, BBC, 18 Mar. 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399.
- Banac, Ivo. “Yugoslavia.” *The American Historical Review*, vol. 97, no. 4, 1992, pp. 1084–1104.
- “The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992.” *Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs*, U.S. Department of State, history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia.
- Doder, Dusko. “Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds.” *Foreign Policy*, no. 91, 1993, p. 3.
- Kamm, Henry. “Growing Yugoslav Ethnic Protests Lead Province Officials to Resign.” *The New York Times*, 1988.
- Mihajlov, Mihajlo. “Can Yugoslavia Survive?” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1991, pp. 79–91.
- Nations, United. “Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council. Supplement 1989-1992 United Nations, 1957.
- Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1989-1992*. United Nations, 2008.
- Steves, Rick. “Understanding Yugoslavia.” *Rick Steves' Europe*, www.ricksteves.com/watch-read-listen/read/understanding-yugoslavia.
- “Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia.” *BBC News*, BBC, 22 May 2006, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm.

Topic II: The Somali Civil War


Background

Established in 1960 and produced from a former British protectorate and an Italian colony, Somalia descended into a vicious armed conflict following the overthrow of former President Siad Barre's military regime in 1991. This conflict is known as the Somali Civil War.

Somali Clans

The Somali are divided into six clan families: Dir, Issaq, Darod, Hawiye, Digil, and Rahanweyne. These are further divided, according to agnatic descent, into subsidiary clans or lineage groups. This system and the shifting alliances of clan groups are fundamental aspects of Somalia's social, political, and economic culture.

Diagram 1: Somali Clans and Modern Politico-Military Movements



1961-1991: Siad Barre and the SRC

The Somali Republic attained independence in 1960, and for its first nine years, Somalia enjoyed a succession of democratically elected governments.

But in October of 1969, Somalia's transition into constitutional democracy was brought to an end. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, the elected president of Somalia, was assassinated by a member of his presidential guard. The speaker of the Somali Parliament, Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein, consequently assumed power, but his six-day tenure was cut short by a military coup led by General Mohamed Siad Barre, who seized power and held it for 21 years.

Alongside Barre, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) military junta government that assumed power was led by Lieutenant Colonel Salaad Gabeyre Kediye and Chief of Police Jama Korshel. The SRC and Barre established Somalia as a one-party, socialist state. Barre renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic and instituted domestic and economic programs based on socialist models: he established cooperative mills, farms, and food-processing factories; he began the Shalanbood Sanddune Stoppage, whereby hundreds of hectares of land in danger of being subsumed by shifting sand dunes was planted with trees; and he nationalized scores of companies and industries, including banks, insurance companies, and oil companies. Furthermore, the country became close allies with the Soviet Union, which provided military and economic assistance to the SDR in the years following its inception. The SRC dissolved

Somalia's parliament, suspended its constitution, banned political parties, arrested politicians, curbed press freedom, and nationalized much of the economy.

Barre advocated for Somali nationalism and against the clan-based system Somalia had used for centuries. He outlawed displays of allegiance to clans, the asking of someone's clan, and all clan-based politics. But despite outlawing clans and promoting centralization, Barre permitted established clan leaders to exert semi-autonomous control over their regions of influence.

In greatly centralizing his government's control, Barre severely weakened traditional structures in Somali society that had traditionally kept civil order. To help maintain his grip on power, Barre played different Somali clans against each other, sowing the seeds of the fratricidal chaos and mass starvation to come.

1977-1991: The Ogaden War and the Downfall of Barre's Regime

As part of his call for Somali nationalism, Barre had articulated the notion of a "Greater Somalia", which included the ethnic Somalis who were incorporated into nearby countries. One of the most prominent of these was the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Relying on both Soviet military aid and future Soviet support, Barre invaded the Ogaden region in 1977. This invasion was met with international opposition, including that of the Soviet Union, which sided with Ethiopia: it cut off aid to Somalia and sent enormous amounts of military aid to Ethiopia. 15,000 Cuban troops were also sent into the region to support Ethiopia. The Somali troops were forced to withdraw.

Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War was a devastating loss and was significant to the downfall of Barre's regime. It shifted Somalia's allegiance from the Soviet Union to the United States: Barre expelled his Soviet advisers, nullified his treaty of allegiance to the former, and sought aid from the latter. Following the Ogaden War and until 1991, the U.S. sent hundreds of millions of dollars of arms to the Barre regime in return for the use of military facilities that had been originally constructed for the Soviets. These bases were to be used to support U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. The U.S. government ignored warnings throughout the 1980s by Africa specialists, human rights groups, and humanitarian organizations that continued U.S. support of the Barre government would eventually plunge Somalia into chaos.

In addition to changing foreign relations, the war and Somalia's defeat also strained the Somali economy and military. This forced Barre to restructure a recent loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the terms of this loan forced him to reverse many of his nationalization programs to little economic avail. This in turn further weakened the Siad regime and rendered it vulnerable to clan pressures. The Marjeerteen clan attempted in April 1978 to remove Barre through a coup. Although the coup failed, it paved the way for the formation of two opposition groups: the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), based on the Majeerteen clan, and the Somali National Movement (SNM), based on the Isaaq clan. Both organizations were formed in 1982 and undertook guerrilla operations rooted in Ethiopia.

In 1988, Somalia and Ethiopia signed a peace agreement, causing the SNM to fear Ethiopia would cease supporting it. The SNM then seized Hargeisa and Burao, which enticed

Barre to lay siege to Hargeisa, eventually destroying 70% of the city in air raids. Members of the Hawiye clan formed the United Somali Congress in Rome the next year, causing Barre to attack members of the Hawiye clan living in Somalia en masse. At the same time, troops lead by the United Somali Congress launched a counter-strike into Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. From December of 1990 to January of 1991, troops of the United Somali Congress battled those controlled by Siad Barre in Mogadishu. On the 27th of January, 1991, Siad Barre fled the capital and was officially ousted as President of Somalia.

Current Situation: January 1st, 1992

The overthrow of Barre's regime left a power vacuum, and many opposition groups are vying to fill it. The struggle for power in Somalia has led to violence. From December 1991 to now, southern Somalia has suffered almost continual warfare. The coastal towns of Merca, Brava and Kismayo and the inland towns of Baidoba and Bardheere have suffered invasions by the undisciplined fighters of the USC, SPM, SNF, and others.

Following Barre's ousting, ensuing violence and chaos have ravaged Somalia. Rape, mass executions, destruction of agricultural land, looting of grain stores and livestock, and destruction of water supplies and homes all led to mass starvation and the massive displacement of people into Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen. Attempts to distribute relief food were undermined by looting and rake-offs by militias. Furthermore, many embassies that had been in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, have since closed due to the country's lack of a central government and its otherwise violent, desolate state. These closings have further severed Somalia's foreign relations.

1992 is a pivotal year for the Somali Civil War. With its geographical position; its untapped oil, gas, uranium, and other mineral resources; and its unstable, devastated state, Somalia is both the microcosm of its region and in dire need of attention. Decisions must be made to address its urgent humanitarian, economic, and political crises and to determine the war's outcome.

Questions to Consider

1. Consider the previous effects of Soviet and American support on Somalia. Would further foreign intervention be helpful or injurious? What is the best form of engagement from the international community as a whole in order to stabilize the situation?
2. The Soviet Union saw the strategic potential of having Somalia as a communist ally controlling access to the Red Sea and thus, the vital trade between Europe and Asia. Does Somalia possess any resources or advantages that may influence your country's level of involvement?
3. Can new weapons be prevented from entering the war zone? Is an arms embargo needed?

4. How can the unarmed be protected until the violence in Somalia is moderated or eliminated?
5. Barre's centralized, nationalist government contrasts starkly from Somalia's clan-based system. What political framework would best suit the country?

Bloc Positions

African Bloc

1. Cabo Verde

Cabo Verde follows a policy of nonalignment and seeks cooperative relations with all friendly states. It is actively interested in foreign affairs, particularly those in and/or concerning Africa.

2. Morocco

There are various factors influencing Morocco's foreign relations, including considerations of immigration, global identity, and foreign policy support. Regarding the latter, Morocco often gains financial support from the countries it assists. It has a history of supporting the United States and consequently receiving the United States' financial support. The actions of the United States will likely influence those of Morocco.

3. Zimbabwe

The country of Zimbabwe maintains a close relationship with China; China's views will likely factor into those of Zimbabwe.

Asia-Pacific Bloc

1. China

Somalia and China have a long history of trade, military, and cultural relations. In January of 1991, the Chinese embassy in Mogadishu closed down operations due to the start of the Somali Civil War and its consequential chaos.

2. India

The relationship between India and the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, dates back to ancient times. The two countries have a history of trade. In 1961, India opened its embassy in Mogadishu. The embassy has since closed in 1991, following the outbreak of the war.

3. Japan

Prior to 1991, Somali authorities maintained bilateral relations with the government of Japan. Following the start of the war, Japanese authorities have pledged to provide Somalia with development funds through various international organizations.

Eastern European Bloc

1. Hungary

In the mid to late-twentieth century, Hungary's foreign policy has generally followed the Soviet lead. During the Communist period, Hungary maintained treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with forces including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria. It was one of the founding members of the Soviet-

led Warsaw Pact and Comecon. Thus, the government of Hungary may be supportive toward the SRC and similar regimes, and it may be influenced by the actions of the Russian Federation.

2. Russian Federation

As mentioned before, Somalia was once aligned with and received aid from the Soviet Union, but after Soviet support redirected to Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, the relationship between the two powers has been strained. Furthermore, with the overthrow of Barre's Marxist and Leninist regime and the collapse of the USSR just yesterday, the ideologies and cultures of Russia and Somalia have considerably less overlap than they once did.

Regarding the ruin of the Soviet Union, Russia may undergo an era of dramatic political transform and uncertainty in the global policy area, especially since the Soviet Union had already experienced a crisis a year prior to its destruction. The end of the USSR is projected to leave Russia in a state of economic, political, and social chaos, marked by declining economic output and increasing inflation, foreign debt, and budget deficits. In a crisis itself, Russia's government may be interested in helping those who can help it; for example, it may consider Somalia's various resources and its geographic location as factors in its decisions.

Latin American and Caribbean Bloc

1. Ecuador

Prior to 1992, Ecuador has had little formal ties to Somalia. However, in the past, Ecuador has maintained strong relationships with both Venezuela and the United States, especially the latter. Under the León Esteban Febres-Cordero Ribadeneyra administration, which lasted from 1985 to 1988, Ecuador's foreign policy goals closely identified with those of the United States. However, its goals under President Rodrigo Borja Cevallos from 1988 to 1992 have been more diversified.

2. Venezuela

Much like the other member of its bloc, Venezuela has little formal history with Somalia. However, relations between the United States and Venezuela have traditionally been close, and the actions of the United States may aid in determining those of Venezuela. Historically, Venezuela has often opposed intervention.

Western European and Others Bloc

1. Austria

Since 1955, Austria has based its foreign policy upon the idea of neutrality: its Federal Assembly passed a constitutional law in which Austria declared "her perpetual neutrality" and stated that after the passing of the law, "Austria will not join any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on her territory."

However, in recent years, Austria appears to have indicated that it is reassessing its adherence to this law. This indication came most notably in 1961 when the Austrian government granted overflight rights for the UN-sanctioned action against Iraq. With that being said, neutrality remains a consideration for Austria.

2. Belgium

Although its relationship with Somalia has been limited thus far, through its position in the European Union and in NATO, Belgium may contribute significantly to the discussion and decisions surrounding the Somali Civil War. Belgium has long been a proponent of European integration; it may be influenced by the other members of the European Union, or vice versa. Furthermore, it remains a strong proponent of NATO, and within the alliance framework, it cooperates closely with the United States.

Despite some opposition, Belgium has generally supported the NATO modernization programs for air defense and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The Belgian government thus may take a stance on the issue of weapons in Somalia.

3. France

Bilateral relations between France and Somalia were established shortly after Somalia's independence. The French government opened an embassy in Mogadishu, and its Somali counterpart opened an embassy in Paris. As of March 1992, the French embassy remains open.

4. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's relations with Somalia date back to the 19th century. In fact, the Somali Republic was formed after the British Somaliland protectorate became independent in 1961 and united with the Trust Territory of Somalia (the former Italian Somaliland).

After the start of the Somali Civil War and the following shutdown of Somalia's central government, the United Kingdom's embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia closed down. However, the British government has not formally severed diplomatic ties with Somalia.

5. United States

Prior to the Ogaden War, the United States had been courting the Somali government due to its aforementioned access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The U.S. strategically provided Somalia with military support in exchange for the use of its facilities. Somalia's geographical position remains a consideration due to continued U.S. interference in the Middle East.

However, the U.S. government has received significant criticism for its military funding. Many believe that had the U.S. government not supported the Barre regime with large amounts of aid, he would have been forced to step down long before his misrule splintered the country. Although the U.S. provided the country with vast amounts of military support, there was virtually no assistance offered to help build a self-sustaining economy that could feed Somalia's people. In addition, the U.S. pushed a structural adjustment program through the International Monetary Fund that severely weakened the local agricultural economy. Criticism of its past actions may influence future involvement from the U.S. government.

The U.S. was one of many countries to evacuate and close its embassy in Somalia with the commencement of the war.

Works Cited

- Hogg, Annabel Lee. "Timeline: Somalia, 1991-2008." *The Atlantic*, Atlantic Media Company, 22 Dec. 2008, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/12/timeline-somalia-1991-2008/307190/.
- Ingiiriis, Mohamed Haji. "How Somalia Works: Mimicry and the Making of Mohamed Siad Barre's Regime in Mogadishu." *Africa Today*, vol. 63, no. 1, 1 Oct. 2016, pp. 57–83.
- Janzen, Jörg H.A., and Ioan M. Lewis. "Somalia." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 28 Aug. 2018, www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Civil-war
- Kusow, Abdi. "The Genesis of the Somali Civil War: A New Perspective." *Northeast African Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1994, pp. 31–46.
- Mishra, Saurabh. "Somalia." *US-Cuba Relations: From Breakdown to Breakthrough | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 2012, idsa.in/africatrends/somalia_smishra_0612.
- O'Kasick, Jeremy. "Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia." *Global Policy Forum*, 2007, www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/153/26334.html.
- Pike, John. "Somalia Civil War." *Global Security*, 2008, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm.
- "Somali Civil War." *New World Encyclopedia*, www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Somali_Civil_War.
- Zunes, Stephen. "Somalia as a Military Target ." *Foreign Policy In Focus*, Institute for Policy Studies, 12 June 2013, fpif.org/somalia_as_a_military_target/.